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1  BACKGROUND 
On 5 August 2016, the Electoral Court 
delivered its judgment in the case of 
National Freedom Party v The Electoral 
Commission and Others (NFP No 2)1 and 
dismissed an application by the National 
Freedom Party (NFP) to retrospectively 
amend the electoral timetable.2 This 
second case followed an unsuccessful 
earlier attempt to seek a similar order in 
                                                 
1 National Freedom Party v The Electoral 
Commission and Others (011/2016 EC); [2016] 
ZAEC 3. 
2 See paras 20 and 34. 
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the same court in the case of National Freedom Party v Electoral Commission and 
Another (NFP No 1).3 In the case under discussion (NFP No 2), the second to seventh 
respondents were all registered political parties that indicated in their founding 
affidavit that they supported the cause of the NFP to be included in the 2016 municipal 
elections. 
The NFP sought relief in court, in the form of a review of, alternatively an appeal 
against, a decision of the Electoral Commission in which it declined to exercise its 
discretion under section 11(2)(b) of the Local  Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 
of 2000. The provision states that “the Commission may, by notice as required in 
subsection (1)(b), amend the election timetable if: (a) it considers it necessary for a free 
and fair election; or (b) the voting day is postponed”. 
The exercise of such discretion would lead to the extension of the time period 
within which political parties could pay the deposit required for them to participate in 
the August 2016 local elections. This would enable the NFP to participate in the 
elections. However, the Court proceeded to consider the matter as a review in terms of 
section 20(1)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 after counsel abandoned 
the appeal approach. Section 20(1)(a) deals with the powers, duties and functions of the 
Electoral Court and states that “the Electoral Court may review any decision of the 
Commission relating to an electoral matter”.  
2 BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE INITIAL CASE 
In the NFP No 1 case, the NFP, a registered political party which intended to participate 
in the 2016 national municipal elections scheduled for 3 August 2016, sought an order 
compelling the Electoral Commission to publish a new Government Gazette effectively 
varying the electoral timetable. This followed the NFP’s failure to pay the required 
registration fees by the cut-off date of 2 June 2016 as required by the law,4 and as 
published in the Government Gazette by the Electoral Commission.5 It emerged in court 
that the NFP had only made payment some three weeks later on 22 June 2016. This 
effectively meant that the NFP would not be able to participate in the 2016 municipal 
elections. The NFP then lodged an application before the Electoral Court in which it 
sought leave to appeal the decision of the Electoral Commission. After finding that there 
was no order made by the Electoral Commission which could form the basis of an 
appeal,6 the Court turned to the question of the Commission’s power to vary the 
electoral timetable. It found that the Electoral Commission had the power to vary the 
electoral timetable,7 but that this must not be done in a way that prejudices other 
                                                 
3 National Freedom Party v Electoral Commission and Another (006/2016 EC); [2016] ZAEC 2. 
4 Sections 14 and 17 of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 require that parties 
intent on participating in municipal elections should pay a stipulated deposit to the Electoral Commission, 
within a particular time period as published by the Electoral Commission in a Gazette. 
5 “Election Timetable” in Government Gazette 564 of 24 May 2016. 
6 NFP No 1 para 19. 
7 The Electoral Commission can amend the timetable as provided for in s 22(1)(b) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Electoral Act. 
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parties,8 and that the timetable should not be changed at the whim of an individual or 
party.9 The Court emphasised the need to guard against abuse of the extension process 
as this may lead to an increase in ad hoc extensions.10 The Court also dealt with the 
question of referring the matter “back” to the Electoral Commission for it to consider 
the inclusion of the NFP in the list of contesting parties, despite the latter’s failure to 
comply with the election timetable. It found that the Commission has no such power. It 
therefore dismissed the matter with costs.11 
3 THE APPLICATION OF THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE IN ELECTORAL CASES 
As stated earlier, the reliance on the defence of res judicata arose as a result of the 
matter being heard and adjudicated in the same court on 1 July 2016 (NFP No 2).12 
Section 14(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act states: 
A party may contest an election in terms of section 13(1)(a) or (c) only if the party by 
not later than a date stated in the timetable for the election has submitted to the office of 
the Commission’s local representative (b) a deposit equal to a prescribed amount, if any, 
payable by means of a bank guaranteed cheque in favour of the Commission.13 
Section 17(2) of the same Act deals with the requirements for ward candidates to 
contest elections and states that “[t]he following must be attached to a nomination 
when the nomination is submitted to the Commission: (d) a deposit equal to a 
prescribed amount, if any, payable by means of a bank guaranteed cheque in favour of 
the Commission.”14 The parties were supposed to pay the relevant deposit by 1700hrs 
on 2 June 2016. The NFP only paid the deposit on 22 June 2016.  
In their submissions, the Electoral Commission and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) raised the issue that since the same matter, involving essentially the same parties, 
had been dealt with in the NFP No 1 case, it was now res judicata. It could therefore not 
be re-opened before or re-adjudicated by the Court. Although in the first matter only the 
IFP was cited whilst the second matter cited six additional political parties, the subject 
matter remained essentially the same. 
Res judicata is the legal doctrine that bars continued litigation of the same case, 
on the same issues, between the same parties. The Court, relying on the case of Molaudzi 
v S,15 explained the doctrine of res judicata as “the legal doctrine that bars continued 
litigation of the same case, on the same issues, between the same parties”. This is so 
because of the authority with which, in the public interest, judicial decisions are 
invested. Therefore effect must be given to a final judgment, even if it is erroneous. In 
                                                 
8 NFP No 1 para 32. 
9 At para 30. 
10 At para 33. 
11 At paras 40 and 42. 
12 NFP No 2 para 8. 
13 Section 14(1)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000. 
14 Section 17(2)(d)  of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000. 
15 Molaudzi v S [2015] ZACC 20 para 14. 
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this regard the enquiry is not whether the judgment is right or wrong, but simply 
whether there is a judgment.16 It also relied on Claassen’s definition, that res judicata 
essentially means “the case or matter is decided”.17 Claassen’s definition is echoed by 
Sinai, who asserts that the term res judicata refers to the various ways in which one 
judgment exercises a binding effect on another.18 
The Court stated that the doctrine is foundational to the rule of law, to the 
certainty and finality that must accompany legal determinations, such as court 
judgments. As such, it is necessary for legal certainty and the proper administration of 
justice. It further limits the possibility of needless litigation. The doctrine, the Court 
opined, traces its history from Roman Law, in particular the Digest 50.17.207, in terms 
of which once a matter is adjudged, it is accepted as truth.  
The underlying rationale for the doctrine of res judicata is to give effect to the 
finality of judgments. Where a cause of action has been litigated to finality between the 
same parties in a previous action, a subsequent attempt by one party to proceed against 
the other party on the same cause of action should not be permitted. It is an attempt to 
limit needless litigation and ensure certainty on some matters that have been decided 
by the courts.19 Res judicata thus plays an important role in promoting legal certainty 
and the proper administration of justice. Corbett JA, as he then was, had the following to 
say about such a plea in Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd:20 
Closely allied to the ‘once and for all’ rule is the principle of res judicata which 
establishes that, where a final judgment has been given in a matter by a competent 
court, then subsequent litigation between the same parties, or their privies, in regard to 
the same subject-matter and based upon the same cause of action is not permissible and, 
if attempted by one of them, can be met by the exceptio rei judicatae vel litis finitae. The 
object of this principle is to prevent the repetition of lawsuits, the harassment of a 
defendant by a multiplicity of actions and the possibility of conflicting decisions. 
The doctrine is based on three maxims, namely: (a) nemo debet bis vexari pro una et 
eadem causa (no man should be punished twice for the same cause); (b) interest 
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end 
to a litigation); and (c) res judicata pro veritate occipitur (a judicial decision must be 
accepted as correct). From the above discussion, the question that begs an answer is 
whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is absolute? We canvas a few points below, 
which address this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
16 NFP No 2 para 14. 
17 Claassen RD Dictionary of legal words and phrases (South Africa: LexisNexis 1997). 
18 Sinai Y “Reconsidering res judicata: a comparative perspective” (2011) 21 Duke Journal of Comparative 
Law 353. 
19 NFP No 2 para 16. 
20 Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) 835F-G. 
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4 IS THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA ABSOLUTE?  
To remedy the injustice which would occur from the inability to overturn an erroneous 
decision, the doctrine of exceptio rei judicatae was developed. Essentially, this is 
premised on the understanding that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be absolute. 
Indeed in Molaudzi,21 the Court stated that since res judicata is a common law principle, 
it follows that courts have the power to develop or relax the doctrine if doing so would 
be in the interests of justice. Courts are empowered by section 173 of the Constitution 
“to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interest of justice”. This inherent power of courts to regulate their own 
process is aimed at curing inflexibilities of the justice system, and it does not apply to 
substantive rights but to adjectival or procedural rights.22 However, section 173 limits 
these powers only to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
High Court.23 It does not extend them to the Electoral Court. Counsel did not, correctly 
so, rely on section 173 since on the face of it, it does not apply to the Electoral Court.  
It is, however, our argument that counsel should have approached the Court on a 
basis analogous to section 173 of the Constitution. Section 18 of the Electoral 
Commissions Act 51 of 1996 establishes the Electoral Court as a specialist court with 
the highest authority on matters relating to elections. It has the same status as the High 
Court and is subordinate only to the Constitutional Court. Section 20(1)(a) of the same 
Act provides that the Electoral Court “may review any decision of the Commission 
relating to an electoral matter”, whilst subsection (3) provides that “the Electoral Court 
may determine its own practice and procedures and make its own rules”. This basically 
means that the powers of the Electoral Court in electoral matters are wide-ranging. The 
Electoral Court has already pronounced on its far-reaching powers in African Christian 
Democratic Party and Others v The Chairperson, Independent Electoral Commission.24 In 
casu, the main contention had been that the Electoral Court had no jurisdiction to deal 
with a matter which the Commission refused to deal with. This was so because the 
Court was a creature of statute and only derived its jurisdiction from the statute 
creating it, unlike the Supreme Court which had inherent jurisdiction.25 In dismissing 
that argument, the Electoral Court placed emphasis on the wording of section 18 of the 
Electoral Commission Act, which explicitly accords the Court the status of the Supreme 
Court (now the High Court).26 The Court also opined that whilst there may be merit in 
the argument that it does not have inherent powers akin to those of the High Court, it 
does enjoy extensive powers in electoral matters, since it is the final court of appeal or 
review in all such matters. It is our argument that a reliance on sections 20(1)(a) and 
(3) read together with section 18 of the Electoral Commission Act would have advanced 
the case for the applicant. 
                                                 
21 Molaudzi v S [2015] ZACC 20 para 32. 
22 Oosthuizen v Road Accident Fund [2011] ZASCA 118 para 26. 
23  Du Bois F Wille’s Principles of South African law 9 ed (Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd 2007) 93. 
24 African Christian Democratic Party and Others v The Chairperson, Independent Electoral Commission 
[2004] ZAEC 2. 
25 At para 12. 
26 At para 13.  
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In Molaudzi, the Constitutional Court had to reverse its own decision, issued 
earlier in which it dismissed Mr Molaudzi’s appeal against his conviction by the trial 
court 10 years earlier.27 The earlier application had been dismissed on the basis that it 
did not raise a proper constitutional issue, and further that it did not bear reasonable 
prospects of success. Pursuant to directions issued by the Constitutional Court, Mr 
Molaudzi brought a further application (second application) for leave to appeal, and this 
time around he raised constitutional issues.   
The Electoral Court, referencing the Constitutional Court in Molaudzi,28 stated 
that exceptions to res judicata are necessitated by the fact that “to perpetuate an error is 
no virtue but to correct it is a compulsion of judicial conscience”. The Court went on to 
make a finding that the case before it did not exhibit any of the requisite elements to 
warrant a departure from the doctrine of res judicata. This was because the applicant 
did not allege that any injustice existed which needed to be corrected. In the Court’s 
opinion, the NFP’s application was not based on any allegation of fraud or sabotage that 
could warrant abandoning the res judicata principle. According to the Court, the matter 
was an application for condonation of the NFP’s failure to pay the required deposit on 
time. The requirement of an egregious element was stated by the Constitutional Court in 
Molaudzi 29 where it was held that for the Court to depart from the doctrine of res 
judicata, the case at hand must “demonstrate exceptional circumstances that cry out for 
flexibility on the part of the Court” and that the interests of justice require the relaxation 
of the legal principle. The Electoral Court concluded that pursuant to the above, the 
matter was res judicata, and dismissed the application.  
 5 ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND SABOTAGE 
The Court did, however, proceed to examine other grounds upon which the application 
could be refused. The first was the fact that there was no room for condonation of late 
payments. For instance, the law does not envisage the payment of fines for late 
payments, neither does it envisage an application for an extension of time. This position 
the Court had already laid down in the previous application (in NFP No 1). The Court 
reiterated its view that, once published, the electoral timetable becomes subordinate 
legislation and binds all parties. It too does not provide for condonation of non-
compliance therewith. Further, that relief for varying of the election timetable cannot be 
granted to an individual party. 
The Court also found that there was no evidence of fraud or sabotage, even 
though this was raised by the NFP to justify the application to re-open the case. The 
Court took issue with the fact that in the first application the NFP had attributed the 
failure to pay the deposit to a mistake on the part of its treasurer, yet it was now 
suggesting that this was part of an elaborate scheme to sabotage the NFP. The Court 
opined that the legal principles pertinent to the matter at hand do not allow for a 
                                                 
27 Molaudzi v S [2014] ZACC 15. 
28 Molaudzi v S [2015] ZACC 20 para 30. 
29 At paras 37 and 46. 
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different conclusion even in the event of sabotage. The evidence before the Court did 
not support the allegation of sabotage or fraud. 
Sworn affidavits had been submitted to the Court, stating that the treasurer had 
been approached by the IFP on 8 March 2016 and sought to persuade him to join their 
ranks, and this was put forward as evidence that the treasurer deliberately sabotaged 
the NFP as part of his deal to join the IFP. The Court rejected this argument, holding that 
this incident occurred well before the question of the payment of the deposit. Further, 
that there was no causal nexus between the payment or non-payment of the deposit and 
the discussion between the two. 
The NFP had also unsuccessfully tried to rely on Electoral Commission v 
Mhlophe,30 where the Constitutional Court stated that courts have power under section 
172(1)(b) of the Constitution to grant remedies that are just and appropriate, even in 
cases that seem beyond resolution. These orders, which must be just and equitable, flow 
from considerations of justice and equity, and may allow the Court to issue an order in 
the interests of justice and equity, even though the matter flows from conduct which is 
patently unlawful. This could be done, for instance, to prevent a constitutional crisis. 
The NFP was basically urging this Court to find that, even though the Electoral 
Commission did not make a decision, and has no power to vary the electoral timetable, 
the order sought by the NFP would lead to justice and equity, because not granting it 
would have far-reaching implications.  
The Electoral Court was not convinced by this argument, holding that this case 
must be distinguished from Mhlophe. This is so because in Mhlophe, the Constitutional 
Court’s conclusion was premised on a finding in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the 
Constitution that the conduct of the Commission was inconsistent with the Constitution 
and therefore invalid. In the current case, the Court continued, there was no such 
conduct, and as such, a finding of inconsistency could not be arrived at. Thus, the 
reliance on section 172(1)(b) was misplaced. 
 6 THE CASE’S CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Court made it clear in this case that there is no place for ad hoc extensions of the 
electoral timetable, as this would prejudice other parties. It is only where the extension 
would benefit all the parties and independent candidates that it can be envisaged.31 This 
is necessary for the integrity of the electoral process. It influences whether the election 
outcome would be perceived as legitimate or not, whether the process will be found by 
all in an open democracy to have been free and fair. 
The case also gave guidance in the event of legislative silence regarding 
condonation following non-compliance. The Court opined that there is no provision 
which enables it to grant condonation for non-compliance with the provision of the 
                                                 
30 Electoral Commission v Mhlophe [2016] ZACC 15 para 132. 
31 NFP No 2 para 20. 
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relevant legislation, neither is there any provision for the Electoral Commission to grant 
condonation to anyone regarding non-compliance with the law. It stated further that 
there is no sanction for non-compliance other than placing oneself outside the contest 
due to non-compliance. In other words, the only outcome for non-compliance was that 
the party failing to pay the electoral deposit would not be able to participate in the 
elections. 
The case also ventilated the issue of exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata, the 
so-called exceptio rei judicatae. What came out firmly was that a court will depart from 
this doctrine if doing so will be in the interests of fairness and equality. However, such 
consideration does not merely mean fairness only to the party seeking such an order, 
but means fairness to all parties concerned. As the Court put it, the doctrine cannot be 
invoked whimsically. Indeed this resonates with De Villiers CJ’s assertion in Bertram 
that, “unless carefully circumscribed, the defence of res judicata is capable of producing 
great hardship and even positive injustice to individuals”.32 It would seem, even in the 
case at hand, that the Court exercised extreme caution and decided to lean more 
towards the res judicata argument in order to avoid injustice to all parties involved. This 
cautionary approach resonates with the Court’s sentiment in the Bafokeng Tribe case, 
that the principle of res judicata “must be carefully delineated and demarcated in order 
to prevent hardship and actual injustice to the parties”.33 
7  CONCLUSION 
The NFP No 2 case, apart from expanding on the res judicata principle, also illuminated 
several key points in relation to political rights and the rights of political parties to 
participate in free and fair elections as enumerated above. The case also brought to the 
public domain what goes on behind the scenes ahead of an election, thereby allowing 
the electorate to fully appreciate what free and fair elections actually mean. It also 
brought into sharp focus the powers and limitations of the Electoral Court and the 
Electoral Commission., 
 
                                                 
32 Bertram v Wood (1983) 10 SC 177 180. 
33 Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd and Others 1999 (3) SA 517 (SCA) 566B-F. 
